Final Comments on Obama Regulatory Review Process
Final Comments on Obama Regulatory Review Process, joint letter from several CPR Member Scholars
Author(s): Robert Glicksman, Thomas McGarity, Sidney Shapiro, Amy Sinden, Rena Steinzor, Robert Verchick
The Truth About Torts: Rethinking Regulatory Preemption
The Truth About Torts: Rethinking Regulatory Preemption, CPR White Paper 902
Author(s): William Buzbee, Bill Funk, Thomas McGarity, Nina Mendelson, Sidney Shapiro, David Vladeck, Matt Shudtz
Preliminary Comments on Obama Regulatory Process Memo.
January 26, 2009. The Choices Facing Cass Sunstein: CPR Member Scholars Point to Trouble Ahead for ‘Regulatory Czar’
Reinvigorating Protection Of Health, Safety, And The Environment: The Choices Facing Cass Sunstein
December 18, 2008, New CPR Report Spotlights Dangers of Regulatory Preemption at Consumer Product Safety Commission.
Can We Afford the Future? The Economics of a Warming World
In Can We Afford the Future?, Frank Ackerman offers a refreshing look at the economics of climate change, explaining how the arbitrary assumptions of conventional theories get in the way of understanding this urgent problem. The benefits of climate protection are vital but priceless, and hence often devalued in economists’ cost-benefit calculations. Preparation for the most predictable outcomes of global warming is less important than protection against the growing risk of catastrophic change; massive investment in new, low carbon technologies and industries should be thought of as life insurance for the planet. Ackerman makes an impassioned plea to construct a better economics, arguing that the solutions are affordable and the alternative is unthinkable. After all, if we can't afford the future, what are we saving our money for?
Author(s): Frank Ackerman
Preemption Choice: The Theory, Law, and Reality of Federalism's Core Question
The Constitution’s federalist structures protect states’ sovereignty but also create a powerful federal government that can preempt and thereby displace the authority of state and local governments and courts to respond to a social challenge. Despite this preemptive power, Congress and agencies have seldom preempted state power. Instead, they typically have embraced concurrent, overlapping power. Recent legislative, agency, and court actions, however, reveal a newly aggressive use of federal preemption, sometimes even preempting more protective state law. Preemption choice fundamentally involves issues of institutional choice and regulatory design: should federal actors displace or work in conjunction with other legal institutions? This book moves logically through each preemption choice step, ranging from underlying theory to constitutional history, to preemption doctrine, to assessment of when preemptive regimes make sense and when state regulation and common law should retain latitude for dynamism and innovation.
Author(s): William Buzbee